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Student Notes 
THE JOURNALIST AND HIS CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE: 
SHOULD A TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE BE ALLOWED 
INTRODUCTION 
A few centuries have slipped by since the ancestor of the 
modern-day journalist had his ears lopped off for publishing a 
libel.1 But the press still claims its martyrs at the hands of the 
courts today-among them, the newsman faced with a choice of 
violating his profession's code of ethics or standing in contempt 
of court. This vexing situation arises when the newsman is 
questioned by proper authority as to the source of information 
which he has received in confidence. By the canons of the Fourth 
Estate, the journalist dares not reveal who gave him his informa-
tion.2 On the other hand, the law on the point is equally clear. 
In the view of the reported cases, no testimonial privilege exists, 
save in those twelve states where such a privilege is specifically 
set out by statute.3 Cases in which the journalist's claim of privi-
lege has been raised are not numerous, indicating perhaps that 
the journalist is usually cooperative with authorities seeking in-
formation.4 However, when the claim does arise, neither the 
judicial nor the existing statuary rules represent the best answer 
in view of the policy questions involved. 
THE BASIS FOR A PRIVILEGE 
A testimonial privilege is a fly in the soup of the law of evi-
dence. It is an exception to the general duty of every citizen to 
testify. Long perished from judicial recognition is the nicety of 
1 Thayer, Legal Control of the Press 9-10 (2d ed. 1950). 
2 See Editor & Publisher 9 (Sept. 1, 1934). For an excellent discussion 
of the newsman's privilege question, see Note. 36 Va. L. Rev. 61 (1950). 
3 Clein v. State, 52 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1950); People ex rel. Mooney v. 
Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936). The states whfoh have en-
acted such statutes are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio and Pennsyl-
vania. See note 10, infra. 
4 References to the cooperative attitude of newsmen were not infre-
quent during a public hearing on a proposed privilege statute in New 
York. See New York Law Revision Commission. Legis. Doc. 65 (A) 104-
46 (1949). At the time a privilege bill was before the New York Legis-
lature, Governor Thomas E. Dewey issued the following statement: · 
The governor has had ten years experience as a prosecutor of 
crime. In all his experience, he has never found it necessary or 
desirable to attempt to compel any newspaperman to reveal the 
source of his information. He has a deep understanding of prob-
lems of the men of the press and the need to protect their sources 
of information. 
Editor & Publisher 8 (l\Iarch 6, 1948). 
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honoring a gentleman's word, or "point of honor."0 Broader 
community interests are at stake when the search for truth is 
underway by proper authority. The commonly accepted personal 
privileges which are recognized today, e.g., lawyer-client, doctor-
patient, husband·wife, are justified on the grounds that the public 
benefits more from protecting the confidentiality of these relation-
ships than it is injured by the barriers such privileges raise in the 
path of legal proceedings.6 Wigmore has reduced the policy con-
siderations to four conditions, upon which he says the recognition 
of a privilege must be predicated. These conditions are: 
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that 
they will not be disclosed; 
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the 
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the 
parties; 
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the com-
munity ought to be sedulously fostered; and 
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the com-
munication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for 
the correct disposal of litigation.7 
While it has been questioned whether currently recognized 
privileges meet these conditions, these propositions serve as the 
best available starting point for the consideration of whether a 
privilege should be granted in any given situation.8 
THE CURRENT LAW 
The current rules which apply to a journalist's source privi-
lege are too inflexible. The judicial view is that, absent statute, 
there is no such privilege.9 The rule is broadly stated and ap-
parently leaves no room for exception, no matter how greatly the 
policy factors would weigh in favor of the journalist. 
5 Duchess of Kingston's Case, 20 How. St. Tr. 856 (1776). Portions 
of the opinions in this case are set out at 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2286 (3d 
ed. 1940). 
6 The statement in the text is essentially a paraphrase of Wigmore's 
four conditions set out above. Wigmore does not specifically refer to 
public benefits, but essentially that is the scale upon which points three 
and four of Wigmore's tests are measured. 
1 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 5, § 2285. 
s Compare R Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 5. §§ 2291, 2332, 2380a, 2396 
with Morgan, Forward, Model Code of Evidence 22-31 (1942). 
9 See note 3 supra; Annot., 102 A.L.R. 771 (1936). 
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The existing statutes, on the other hand, grant too broad a 
privilege, with perhaps the exception of the Arkansas confidence 
law.10 Thus, if the journalist brings himself within the mechani-
10 The statutes allowing the privilege have been criticized as being "ex-
cessive in scope." 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supro note 5. The Arkansas 
statute states that before a newsman can be "required" to disclose his 
source of information "it must be shown that such article was written 
.•. in bad faith, with malice and not in the interest of the public." For 
a discussion of the scope of the various privilege statutes, see Note, 36 
Va. L. Rev. 61, 62-67 (1950). The following table, using the words of 
the statutes, illustrates the scope of the various privilege laws. 
Who Is Protected *See **Date 
Personnel Media State Below Adopted 
-Alabani-a~~·'-P~e_r_s_o_n_s_e_n_g_a_g_e_d~i-n-,-i-~N~e-w_s_p_a_p_e-rs __ , __ Y~e-s __ , ___ 1~9~3=5~ 
Ala. Code connected with, or 
tit. 7, § 370 employed on any 
(1940) newspaper while en-
gaged in news gath-
ering capacity. 
-Arizona. 
Ariz. Code 
Ann. § 23-
103 (Supp. 
1955) 
Person engaged in 
newspaper or re-
portorial work, or 
connected with, or 
employed by any 
newspaper. 
Arlmnsas Editors, reporters, 
Ark Stat. writers for news-
Ann. § 42- papers or period-
917 (Supp. cals, or owner of 
19 5 5) radio station. 
Newspapers 
Newspapers, 
periodicals, 
radio 
Yes 
Yes 
1937 
1936 
(1949) 
-Calif_o_nu_·_a. __ , __ P_u_b_li_s_h_e_rs_,_e_d-it_o_r_s-·'-N-ew-sp_a_p_e_rs __ , __ Y_e_s __ , ___ 1_9_3_5_ 
Cal. Code reporters and other 
Civ. Proc. persons connected 
Ann. § 1881 with or employed 
(6) (Deer- upon a newspaper 
ing 1946) 
-IIldiana 
Ind. Ann. 
Stat. § 2-
1733 (Burns 
1955) 
Bona fide owner, 
editorial or report-
orial employee of 
(printed bedia) and 
bona fide owner, 
or reportorial em-
ployee of (radio 
television) who re-
receive principal 
official, or editorial 
income from legi-
timate writing, edit-
ing, interpretation, 
announcing or 
Weekly, semi-
weekly, tri-
weekly and 
daily news-
papers con-
forming to 
postal regula-
tions and pub-
lished for five 
consecutive 
in same city 
and having 
paid circula-
tion of two 
No 19-41 
(1949) 
broadcasting of 
news. 
NOTES 
percent in 
county in 
which pub-
lished; recogi-
nized press 
associations 
and commeric-
ally licensed 
radio and tele-
vision stations. 
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~K--e-n_t_u-cky ___ , __ P_e_r_s_o_ns __ e_n_g_a_g-ed~,-- 1 -Newspapers-,--t--Y-e_s __ , __ 1_9_5~2--
Ky. Rev. employed or con- radio and 
Stat. § 421.- nected with news- television. 
100 (1953) paper, radio or 
television stations. 
-1\1--a-ry-lan_d ___ ,_Persons engaged---!-N_e_w_s_p_a_p-er-s-,-·1--Y-es __ , ___ 1_8_9_6_ 
l\Id. Code in, connected with Journals, (1949) 
of Gen. or employed on a radio and 
Laws, art. (listed media). television 
35, § 2 
(1951) 
---
-1\Iichigan 
I\Iich. Stat. 
Ann. c. 
287, § 28.-
945 (1) 
(1954) 
-Montana 
Mont, Rev. 
Code Ann. 
§ 93-601-2 
(Supp. 
1955) 
-New Jersey 
N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2:-
97-11 
(1939) 
Ohio 
Ohio Rev. 
Code § 
2739.12 
(1953) 
Reporters 
Persons engaged 
in work of gather-
ing, procuring, com-
piling, editing dis-
seminating, pub-
lishing, broadcast-
ing or televising 
news. 
Persons engaged 
in, connected with, 
or employed on 
any newspaper. 
Persons engaged in 
the work on, or 
connected with. or 
employed by (listed 
media) for purpose 
of gathering, com-
piling, editing, dis-
seminating or pub-
lishing news. 
Newspapers 
and "other 
publications." 
Newspapers, 
press associa-
tions, radio 
and tele-
vision. 
Newspapers 
Newspapers 
and press 
associations. 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
1949 
1943 
(1951) 
1933 
1941 
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cal confines of the statute, he can refuse to disclose his source 
no matter how great a barrier he is raising in the path of im-
portant legal proceedings. The operation of the existing statutes 
is conditioned upon such matters as whether the reporter seeking 
to invoke it gets his primary income from reportorial endeavors,11 
or whether the publication by which the reporter is employed en-
joys a certain percentage of circulation in the county where it is 
published.12 Such elements have, at best, only remote connection 
with the essential policy questions involved. 
WHEN IS THE PUBLIC BENEFITED? 
If there is to be a journalist's source privilege, then there 
must be a benefit accruing to the public from the existence and 
protection of this relationship. The fact that the relationship is 
a common one is evidenced by the almost daily appearance in the 
press of news items quoting "informed sources," "usually reliable 
sources,'' and other such undisclosed sources of information. That 
the public is benefited by a free flow of news is a proposition 
which needs no argument. In general, it would seem that if the 
press must rely on undisclosed sources of information in certain 
instances, and these sources provide information otherwise un-
attainable to the press, then the public benefits from the news-
man's relation with his confidential source. But more specific-
ally, where such a relationship brings about the disclosure of a 
situation which requires litigation or investigation, and corrective 
Pennsyl-
vania 
Pa. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 
28 § 330 
(Supp. 
1954) 
Persons engaged 
on, connected with, 
or employed by 
(listed media) for 
the purpose of 
gathering, procur-
ing, compiling, 
editing or publish-
ing news. 
Newspapers 
of general 
circulations 
as defined by 
Pennsylvania 
law, and press 
associations. 
No 1937 
*Some states require the information obtained from confidential sources 
must be published or disseminated before the source can be kept secret. 
This column of the table indicates where this is required by a "Yes" and 
where it is not required by a "No." 
**Dates shown in parenthesis show when the original statute was 
amended to include radio and television, where applicable. 
nind. Ann. Stat.§ 2-1733(Burns1955). 
12 Ibid. The limitation of the privilege on the basis of circulation is 
criticized in Note, 17 Ind. L.J. 162 (1941). 
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action can progress without resort to the journalist's source, then 
the public certainly benefits by the relationship. Such a fact 
situation has arisen in a journalist contempt case before the House 
of Representatives. 
In one of the earliest journalist privilege cases to arise in 
this nation, James W. Simonton, a Washington correspondent for 
the New York Daily Times, (now the widely respected New York 
Times) was cited for contempt of the House for refusing to dis-
close his confidential sources.13 Simonton was called to testify 
after his paper had published charges that bribes were being doled 
out to House members for votes on certain land grant measures.H 
The publication set off an investigation by a select committee, 
and Simonton was an early witness. The committee found the 
substance of Simonton's reports to be essentially true, and these 
conclusions were reached without resort to reporter's sources. The 
corrective action that resulted was the recommended expulsion of 
four members of the House.15 Simonton, nevertheless, was placed 
in the custody of the Sergeant at Arms for the House for a time 
for his contempt in refusing to divulge certain sources.16 It seems 
that here, where the unsavory situation brought to light by the 
journalist could be cleared up without resort to the reporter's 
confidential sources, a privilege should have been recognized. 
A similar case arose some four decades later, this time in the 
Senate.17 Two newspapers claimed bribes, and other improper 
influences, were being exerted to effect the passage of certain 
tariffs favorable to the Sugar Trust. Again, the newspaper 
charges prompted an investigation which found that the bribery 
13 Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 274-75, 411-12 (1857). 
14 The article which touched off the investigation is set out at Cong. 
Clobe, note 13 supra at 274. There was some objection to launching an 
investigation on the basis of a newspaper article. Rep. A. K. Marshall of 
Kentucky said. 
I am extreme unwilling, Mr. Speaker, to base the action of 
this House in reference to this matter upon any charges con-
tained in any newspape of the day .... I have no idea of giving 
to such contemptible things as appear in the newspapers of this 
country the sort of respectability they would obtain by receiving 
notice from this body. 
Cong. Globe, note 13 supra at 275. 
15H.R. Rep. No. 243, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 169-79 (1857). 
16 Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 3d sess. 411-12, 426 (1857). 
17 The second case involved Elisha Edwards and John S. Shriver, cor-
respondents for the Philadelphia Press, and the New York Mail and Ex-
press. See 26 Cong. Rec. 4796, 5451-52 (1894). This and other cases 
dealing with the privileges of the Senate are collected in S. l\Iisc. Doc. No. 
268, 53d Cong., 2d Sess. (1894). 
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charges were true. 18 The correspondents were questioned, and 
again were punished for refusing to reveal their sources of in-
formation.19 Was the public in any way injured because the re-
porters caused an investigation which could be successfully con-
cluded without disclosure of their sources? 
In not every instance is a conclusive result reached in an in-
vestigation triggered by a journalist's charges. For example, the 
charges of corruption and graft raised by a Chicago newsman in 
1934 and investigated by a grand jury apparently were left hang-
ing.20 A.L. Sloan, a reporter for the Chicago American, had writ-
ten a series of stories for his paper charging graft in the Illinois 
Relief Commission, and the Cook County Criminal Court in-
structed the grand jury to investigate the matter on the basis of 
Sloan's articles. Sloan testified extensively, reportedly telling 
where evidence of graft could be found in the books of the com-
mission and offering the names of twenty-six persons who could 
give further information. Sloan, however, refused to answer 
questions propounded by the jury's counsel as to who had led him 
to his information. For this he was brought before the court on 
the jury counsel's motion to cite for contempt. The court refused 
to cite Sloan on the grounds that any further testimony from him 
would be irrelevant.21 While the identification of Sloan's confi-
1s S. Rep. No. 435, 53d Cong., 2d Sess. (1894). 
19 26 Cong. Rec. 5451-52 (1894). The newsmen were this time certi-
fied to the federal district attorney for prosecution under the contumacy 
statute adopted at the time of the earlier Simonton case. 11 Stat. 155 
(1857). with minor revision, 52 Stat. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1952). 
The two reporters were not the only witnesses before the committee who 
refused to testify. See Chapman v. United States, 5 App. D.C. 122, aff'd 
sub nom. In re Chapman, 156 U.S. 211 (1895). 
20 A.L. Sloan (unreported) Editor & Publisher 10, (Aug. 11, 1934). 
21 A portion of the court's opinion was reported as being: 
A reading of Sloan's testimony before the grand jury dis-
closes that he has "discovered" no material proof beyond that 
already in the possession and knowledge of the state's attorney 
of Cook County in certain cases. 
If the court were satisfied that Sloan had facts which might 
lead to the proof of graft, fraud, payroll padding or other crimi-
nal acts, the ends of justice could possibly be served a committ-
ment order, the effect of which might tend to bring these facts 
to light, either from Sloan or from others with whom he may have 
had contact. The record indicates, however, that the state's at-
torney, the grand jury and the court can be more profitabley em-
ployed than living in the hope or expectation of substantial proofs 
from Sloan in his present state of declamatory zeal." 
Editor & Publisher 10 (Aug. 11, 1934). 
Irrelevancy has been a defence in other cases. In Rosenberg v. 
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dential sources reasonably could be an irrelev~n_t matter, it is 
difficult to see from the reported facts of this case that all further 
testimony would be totally irrelevant, especially in the light of the 
fact that the grand jury was instructed to investigate on the basis 
of Sloan's newspaper articles. If Sloan could direct the grand 
jury to evidence which would substantiate the charges without 
divulging his confidential sources, then the administration of 
justice would not be impaired by the recognition of a testimonial 
privilege. 
The benefit accruing to the public can be found in situations 
other than those in which the active misconduct by public officials 
is involved, as in the cases above. There have been a number of 
situations in which the privilege question has arisen where the 
published charges intimated a failure to enforce the laws.22 The 
obvious aim of the publication in such a case is to bring pressure 
to bear on responsible officials to enforce the law. Such a situa-
tion gave rise to the leading case in the field, People ex rel. Mooney 
v. Sheriff.23 
Carroll in re Lyons, 99 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) Leonard Lyons, a 
nationally syndicated columnist, wrote that Mrs. Ethel Rosenberg, under 
a death sentence for espionage, could save herself by "talking" as the 
court could alter her death penalty within 60 days. In a habeas corpus 
proceeding seeking to have Mrs. Rosenberg transfered from the death cell 
block at Sing Sing Prison, Lyons was asked the source of his information. 
The court held that since Lyons' statement was merely a paraphrase of 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 35, his source was irrelevant to the proceedings. 
22 People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff. 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1436) 
is the only reported case dealing with journalist contempt proceedings 
growing out of news items which intimated a failure to enforce the law. 
Other, unreported cases in which journalist contempt proceedings grew 
out of similar situations include: Charles L. Leonard and Douglas Clark 
(unreported) Editor & Publisher 7 (Mar. 6, 1948), discussed in the text 
aboe, pp. 9-10; E.B. Chapman (unreported) N.Y. Times, April 20, 1940, 
p. 8, col. 4; April 21, 1940, p. 12. col. 6, wherein Chapman, an editorial 
writer for the Topeka State Journal, was fined $25 in police court for 
refusing to divulge the sources of his story on vice conditions in Topeka; 
Sherman Stambaugh (unreported) N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1939, p. 19, col. 
4, wherein Stambaugh was cited for contempt for refusing to divulge 
to a grand jury the identity of his sources for a story concerning gambling 
in Toledo, Ohio; and Eddie Barr (unreported) N.Y. Times. March 13, 
1931, p. 25, col. 8, wherein Barr was confined for refusing to divulge to 
a grand jury the source of his story concerning the kidnapping and 
beating of two men immediately after their release from jail in Dallas, 
Texas. Barr purged himself after one day's confinement by indentifying 
an assistant in the district attorney's office as his source. 
23 279 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 {1936). 
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The case arose in New York City in 1934, when Martin 
Mooney wrote a series of articles describing gambling operations 
rampant in the city at that time. Mooney used ficticious names 
and addresses to identify the persons and places in his articles. 
He was called by a grand jury to testify and he did so. But he 
refused to reveal the true names and locations that lay behind the 
fictions in his articles. For this refusal, Mooney was cited to the 
Court of General Sessions for contempt, where he was fined $250 
and sentenced to thirty days in jail.24 Mooney's citation was re-
viewed by the New York Court of Appeals which found such 
punishment to be valid, ruling squarely on the privilege issue. The 
court apparently felt that no public benefit resulted from Mooney's 
writings and settled the question on general considerations of 
testim,onial privileges. The court said : 
The policy of the law is to require the disclosure of all in-
formation by witnesses in order that justice may prevail. The 
granting of a privilege from such disclosure constitutes an excep-
tion to the general rule. In the administration of justice, the 
existence of the privilege from disclosure. as it now exists, often, 
in particular cases, works a hardship. The tendency is not to ex-
tend the classes to whom the privilege from disclosure is granted, 
but to restrict that privilege.25 
It may be true that had Mooney disclosed his sources of in-
formation, the grand jury might have found sufficient evidence 
to indict the gamblers of whom he had written. But it appears 
that Mooney and his newspaper, the New York American, as well 
as others, were more concerned about the general laxity of law 
enforcement than with a single gambling operation.26 How much 
the publication of Mooney's articles helped to generate the public 
pressure which brought about the appointment of Thomas Dewey 
as a special prosecuting attorney cannot be determined accurately. 
However, in helping to bring such pressure to bear and thus en-
couraging better law enforcement, it should be recognized that 
24 Judge Koenig's oral opinion in the trial court, somewhat sympathic 
to newsman Mooney, is set out at New York Law Revision Commission, 
Legis. Doc. 65(A), 19, 21 (1949). It may be that Mooney was as con-
cerned with his personal safety as with "protecting" the identity of his 
sources. A statement by the foreman of the grand jury to the court 
indicated that Mooney, as well as other witnesses, had expressed fear of 
recrimination for giving all the information they had. U.Y. Times, May 
S, 1934, p. 40, col. 2. 
2::; 269 N.Y. at 295, 199 N.E. at 416. 
26 Within two weeks after Mooney appeared in the Court of General 
Sessions, a citizen's committee petitioned the governor of New York for 
the appointment of a special prosecutor to clean up the situation which 
Mooney's articles reflected. 
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the journalist actually is fostering the due administration of 
justice. This element of public benefit should be considered when 
the newsman seeks to keep his sources confidential: The burden 
should be placed first upon the responsible law enforcement of-
ficials. Not until it is shown that such officials cannot obtain 
needed information does the journalist's refusal to disel-Ose h1s 
sources result in a serious public detriment. It is then that the 
privilege claim becomes unjustified. 
The state of New York experienced another similar case in 
1948, this time involving alleged gambling operations in the city 
of Newburgh.27 The New York World Telegram set the stage for 
this case when it published a story describing Newburgh in typi-
cal journalese as "The Barbary Banks of the Hudson." The 
Orange County District Attorney's office replied that the allega-
tions of vice conditions and gambling were "grossly exaggerated,"28 
This statement was rebutted within a few days by the local paper, 
the Newburgh News, when it published reproductions of numbers 
tickets used for gambling in the community. Two members of the 
Newburgh News staff were cited for contempt when they sub-
sequently refused to divulge to a grand jury where they had pro-
cured the numbers tickets. (Their citation for contempt was 
later vacated on grounds of a procedural defect.)29 The New-
burgh incident gave rise to renewed efforts to enact a confidence 
statute in New York and brought about an extensive study of the 
21 Douglas Clarke and Charles L. Leonard (unreported) Editor & Pub-
lisher 7 (Mar. 6, 1948). 
28 Ibid. 
29 People ex rel. Clark v. Truesdell 79 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1948). The 
court held that as the contempt was not committed in the trial court's 
immediate view, the newsmen should have been given notice and reason-
able opportunity to defend. The trial court had committed the newsmen 
summarily. However, while the newsmen were jailed following the con-
tempt citation, they wrote an article for Editor & Publisher, in which they 
set out the following as their statement to the court at the time of their 
citation: 
The code of ethics of the newspaper profession, without any 
statutory authority, stipulates without compromise, that violation 
of a confidence is the gravest ethical omission of which a news-
paperman can stand. We feel that we are bound to complay 
with this principle and to make any sacrifice to perpetuate the 
lofty ideals of the newspaper profession. 
Editor & Publisher 7 (l\Iar. 6, 1948). 
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problem by the New York Law Revision Commission.30 Whether 
a privilege should have been granted in the Newburgh case again 
should have depended upon whether diligent law enforcement of-
ficials could have uncovered the gambling operations. 
Charges bearing on subjects other than criminal conduct and 
corruption have come from the press and given rise to the privi-
lege question. An example of this type is the most recent privi-
lege case to arise before the national legislature.31 Albert Deutsch, 
a reporter for the New York Newspaper PM, published a series 
of articles criticizing the administration of veterans hospitals. He 
was not the only critic on the subject.32 The administration of 
veterans hospitals was being surveyed by the House Committee 
on World War Veterans Legislation and Deutsch was caUed upon 
to give testimony before the committee.33 Deutsch did give testi-
mony, but he refused to disclose the identity of certain hospital 
personnel who had given him information in confidence.34 The 
committee first voted to cite Deutsch for contempt, but later 
reversed its position-apparently because of public pressure gen-
erated in the press.35 If the committee's last resort was Deutsch's 
30See New York Law Revission Commission, Leg. Doc. 65(A) (1949). 
The bill introduced at the time of the Leonard-Clarke incident in 1948 
was commonly known as the Desmond-Mailer Bill. See, Desmond, The 
Newsman's Privilege Bill, 13 Albany L. Rev. 1 (1949). Prior attempts 
to enact journalist privilege bills in New York were made in 1930, 1935, 
1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1946 and 1947. 
31 See Hearings before the House Committee on World War Veterans 
Legislation, Part I, 165-83, 856-662, 79th Cong. 1st Sess. (1945). 
32 Another journalist was questioned by the Committee on World War 
Veterans Legislation about the same time Deutsch appeared. The second 
journalist was Albert Q. Maisel, whose article, "Third-rate Medicine for 
First-rate Men," appeared in Cosmopolitan Magazine, March 1945, p. 35. 
33 Hearings, supra note 31, at 165. 
34 Id. at 172. 
35 Id. at 342. For newspaper protests leveled at the committee's deci-
sion to cite Deutsch for contempt, see 91 Cong. Rec. A2554 (1945). The 
more lenient attitude reflected by the committee in the Deutsch case also 
is reflected in another incident which arose during World War II. In 
January 1943, the Akron (Ohio) Beacon-Journal published claims that 
union seamen had refused to unload badly needed cargo at Guadalcanal 
on Sunday. The sources for the stories were returned veterans who had 
been interviewed by newspaper personnel. A subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Naval Affairs held hearings at which Charles C. Miller, city 
editor, and :Mrs. Helen Waterhouse, a reporter, were questioned. House 
Committee on Naval Affairs, Hearings on Sundry Legislation, No. 29, 121-
96, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943). The subcommittee did not press for 
the names of the veterans who were the sources, and reported: "It would 
have been helpful had the paper seen fit to submit to us the names, which 
we assured the publisher would be kept in confidence so as to minimize 
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informants in order to make an accurate determination of what 
legislation was needed, then Deutsch should have been compelled 
to disclose his sources. If, on the other hand, the committee could 
obtain the needed information without forcing Deutsch to dis-
close his confidential sources, then it would seem a privilege 
could be allowed without detriment to the public. 
These cases indicate that there are instances in which the 
employment of confidential sources by journalists results in a 
very real benefit to the public. Patently absent from the ~aterials 
set out above are the many instances in which the journalist has 
published his information and has never been questioned about 
his source. With the point established that there are instances 
in which the public enjoys a benefit from the relationship, it 
would appear that there are times when a journalist-informant 
privilege could be allowed. The question then arises : How broad 
should such a privilege be'? 
WHEN SHOULD THE PRIVILEGE BE DENIED'? 
There are two conditions which should limit the application 
of the privilege. Both of these conditions are related to the ele-
ment of public benefit. First, where there is an absence of public 
benefit in the disclosure of the information, there is no founda-
tion upon which to build the claim for the privilege. Secondly 
where the public detriment which would be experienced by allow-
ing the privilege is greater than the benefit gained from the pro-
tection of the relationship, then the privilege should not be al-
lowed. 
WHEN IS THERE NO PUBLIC BENEFIT? 
There are two situations in which it is clear that no public 
benefit arises from the revelation of information through the 
employment of a confidential journalist-informant relationship. 
the possibility of military recrimination. We are aware, however, of the 
customary practice of newspapers in not revealing the sources of such 
stories." Hearings, supra, No. 30 at 199. Rep. Magnuson of Washington 
said the newspaper charges were unfounded and praised the Merchant 
Marine. 89 Cong. Rec. A952 (1943). 
In a state case in 1934, however, Vance L. Armentrout was held in 
contempt of the Kentucky House of Representatives when he refused to 
identify who had written a letter-to-the-editor signed "A Member of the 
House of Representatives." The letter was highly critical of the conduct 
of the President of the House in reference to rulings from the chair. 
Armentrout, acting editor of the Louisville Courier, was jailed by the in-
vestigating committee, released on bail, and the House as a body sub-
stituted a $25 fine for incarceration. See Editor & Publisher 4 (March 
24, 1934). 
574 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW 
The first of these occurs where the revelation of the information 
itself violates public policy. Such situations occur when state 
secrets are revealed or the secret proceedings of grand juries are 
published. Journalist. contempt cases have arisen upon both of 
these particular fact backgrounds, and the testimonial privilege 
was properly denied in every instance.36 Clearly, where a privi-
lege is based upon a theory that the newsman is benefiting the 
public by furnishing information which it ought to have, then the 
foundation for the privilege is destroyed when public policy de-
mands that the substance of the information should not be dis-
closed. 37 
The second instance in which no public benefit accrues from 
the publication of the information arises when the information is 
in fact false.38 Obviously, no public benefit results from the dis-
semination of erroneous information. This element has bothered 
some groups which have commented on the privilege question,39 
and probably explains some of the mechanical restrictions of the 
existing privilege statutes.40 Of course, it is a mechanical im-
possibility to use the truth of the newsman's published informa-
tion as an element in determining whether a privilege should be 
36 In the l\Iatter of Wayne, 4 Hawaii Dst. Ct. 475 (1914); Ex parte 
Nugent, 18 Fed. Cas. 471, No. 10375 (C.C.D.C. 1848); Clein v. State, 52 
So.2d 117 (Fla. 1950); Lester M. Hunt (unreported) N.Y. Times, May 
20, 1939, p. 10, col. 4; l\Iay 23, 1939, p. 25, col. 7; John T. Morris (un-
reported) Editor & Publisher 9 (Sept. 1, 1934); Hiram J. Ramsdell and 
Zebb L. White, Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 846-88, 929 (1871). 
The Ramsdell and White case and the Nugent case involved the revelation 
of treaties which were under consideration by the Senate in executive 
session. The remainder deal with disclosure of grand jury proceedings 
and refusals by the newsmen to reveal who had given them their informa-
tion about the secret proceedings. 
37 For discussions of the policy reasons underlying secrecy in grand jury 
proceedings see Schmidt v. United States. 115 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1940); 
United States v. Central Supply Ass'n, 34 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1940); 
United States v. Amazon Industrial Chemical Corp., 55 F.2d 254 (D. Md. 
1931). 
3S In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L. 235, 85 Atl. 1011 (1913). Reporter Julius 
Grunow of the Jersey Journal wrote a news story stating that a trustee 
for the Village of Ridgefield Park had claimed the village surveyor had 
presented claims for grading which had previously been paid. The trus-
tee's claim was allegedly made at a regular village board of trustees meet-
ing, which Grunow did not attend personally. Grunow, called before a 
grand jury investigating the possibility of criminal libel in the publica-
tion, refused to reveal who was his source, and was fined $25. His fine 
was held valid by the New Jersey Supreme Court. 
39 See Memorandum No. 40, Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York. New York Law Revision Commission. Legis. Doc. 65(A) 81 (1949). 
40 See note 10 supra. 
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allowed in a particular case. The accuracy of his news item is 
not determined until after the decision on the privilege question 
is rendered. However, it is essential to know whether the dis-
closure of the newsman's confidential sources is necessary to de-
termine the truth of his published statements. This question can 
be resolved at the th'lle the privilege question is raised. If thB 
information is in fact false, then the privilege would undoubtedly 
be denied on conditions to be discussed below. 
WHEN DOES DETRIMENT OUTWEIGH BENEFIT? 
The prime argument leveled against any testimonial privilege 
is that it hampers the due administration of justice. The public 
is injured when litigation is stymied and the enforcement of the 
law is impeded. It should be noted that hamper is a word of de-
gree, which could include anything from a mere inconvenience to 
an absolute bar to a particular proceeding. The degree to which 
the journalist's refusal to disclose his source hampers an investi-
gation or legal proceeding should be a material consideration. If 
the refusal to disclose the sources causes nothing more than an 
inconvenience, the argument that the due administration of justice 
is impaired is not too overpowering. But, where the refusal ef-
fectively stifles the particular proceeding, the same argument 
would override any claim of public benefit which may support 
the privilege claim. Disclosure of information by a journalist is 
not an end in itself. If the newsman has disclosed a situation re-
quiring investigation, and then stops the investigative process by 
his recalcitrance, he has destroyed the public benefit arising from 
his disclosure through the use of a confidential source. Where 
the proceeding is thus impaired, the privilege should not be al-
lowed to operate and whatever force is necessary should be em-
ployed to bring about the disclosure of the source of information. 
While this element of degree is not specifically discussed in 
the cases, it can be seen that the degree to which the non-dis-
closure has deterred the legal proceeding has varied considerably. 
In the Simonton case, supra, the non-disclosure of the source did 
not prove too great a barrier to the investigation of the specific 
charges Simonton had raised in his published news item. The 
same conclusion can be drawn from the Shriver case, supra. How-
ever, there are cases in which it can be seen that the journalist's 
refusal to disclose his source has effectively barred the accurate 
conclusion of the particular proceeding. 
In the case of Nat Caldwell, a reporter for the Kno};.'Ville 
Tennessean, a grand jury was instructed to investigate possible 
liquor law violations after Caldwell had published a story charg-
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ing such acts.41 Caldwell's story intimated that a state highway 
patrolman had an interest in a local liquor store and was provid-
ing safe conduct for bootlegged liquor out of the county and into 
surrounding "dry" counties. Caldwell refused to disclose where 
he had obtained his information and the grand jury failed to re-
turn an indictment. The County Court of Anderson County re-
fused to cite Caldwell for contempt, on the grounds that a privi-
lege should be recognized.42 It is an open question as to whether 
the grand jury would have found sufficient grounds for an in-
dictment had it been availed of Caldwell's sources. In this situa-
tion, it appears that the grand jury certainly should have had the 
benefit of whatever information Caldwell possessed, and a privi-
lege should not have been allowed. 
Another example of the journalist's non-disclosure apparently 
materially hampering an investigation is the case of A.M. 
Lawrence and L.L. Levings.43 These two San Francisco newsmen 
alleged in news items that bribes were being given to the state 
legislators and they were called to testify before a committee of 
the California Senate. They refused to divulge their sources of 
information and were jailed for contempt. The California Su-
preme Court held their commitment valid in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings, saying: 
If the witnesses, first answering that they had no personal 
knowledge of the matter, were to be justified in refusing to give 
the names of th~ir informant, the senatorial inquiry must neces-i 
sarily come to an end. Upon the other hand, if they stated the 
names of their informants, and the nature of their information, 
the senate could summon those persons and so trace the charges 
to a conclusion. The evidence then was relevant and pertinent.44 
The senatorial investigation was not stymied by the refusal of 
the newsmen to testify, and it proceeded to a conclusion that the 
41 Nat Caldwell (unreported) N.Y. Times, June 1, 1948, p. 25, col. 7; 
Editor & Publisher 59 (May 29, 1948); Editor & Publisher 64 (June 5, 
1948). 
12 The opinion of the county court is set out in New York Law Revision 
Commission, Legis. Doc. 65 (A) 65 (1949): 
The press must get its information thru others, of necessity 
much is given in confidence, and I am unable to hold the witness 
in contempt of this matter. It's true it is hard to have serious 
charges made against public officials on hearsay evidence, but at 
times much good has been done in that way. It puts us all on 
guard, and to ask ourselves: "Lord is it I"? Lincoln said: "If 
the end brings me out alright, what is said against me won't 
amount to anything." 
43 Ex parte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48 Pac. 124 (1897). 
44 Id. at 299, 48 Pac. at 125. 
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charges were false.45 Lawrence later produced documents which 
tended to support the charges which had been made originally.4" 
It would seem that in such a situation, where apparently all other 
sources of information tend to disprove the journalist's claim, a 
proper conclusion cannot be reached without resort to the journa-
list's sources and he should be compelled to reveal them. 
An instance in which a privilege apparently was recognized 
and the proceeding not impaired is evidenced by the case of Frank 
L. Toughill.47 Toughill, a reporter for the Philadelphia Recorcl, 
wrote a story disclosing that the State Alcohol Permit Board had 
issued a license in a secret session and later rescinded their action. 
Toughill was called upon to disclose his source in county court 
proceedings brought to secure issuance of the license. The re-
porter refused to disclose his source, e::i...-plaining that to do so might 
result in his dismissal as a news reporter, and the court did not 
force him to testify on the matter.48 Here, where an accurate 
source of information was the Permit Board itself, the privilege 
was properly recognized. (The court, incidentally, got the needed 
information, and ordered the issuance of the license.) 49 
CONCLUSION 
Adequate grounds exist for the recognition of a journalist-
informant privilege under certain conditions. Instances have been 
pointed out where the use of confidential sources has resulted in 
concrete benefits though the identity of the source has been denied 
to the court or committee seeking to discover it. There are un-
doubtedly countless other instances in which the public has bene-
fited, in varying degrees, from the dissemination of information 
thus gained where the journalist was never called upon to dis-
close where he got his news. 
45 Letter from l\Irs. Carma R. Zimmerman, California State Librarian, 
to Nebraska Law Review. 
46 Ibid. The letter states inter alia: ·•However, a later account of the 
life of Andrew l\I. Lawrence written by Mr. O'Day for the San Francisco 
Recorder and published on March 21 and 22, 1946, seems to indicate that 
Lawrence was successful in bringing telegrams out in public that tainted 
the names of forty-four members of the Legislature. Where O'Day got 
his facts for his article, we have been unable to determine. There have 
been no subsequent official reports on the matter. . . ". 
47 Frank L. Toughill (unreported) Editor & Publisher 16 (Dec. 9, 
1933). Pennsylvania adopted a confidence statute in 1937, see note 10 
supra. 
48 Ibid. 
49 After Toughill was excused from testifying, an attorney for the plain-
tiff-applicant divulged that a deputy attorney general had been the source 
of information. 
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In the main, the use of contempt proceedings has not proved 
a grand success at bringing forth disclosure of the source. Where 
the privilege has been denied, its place has been filled with the 
journalist's obstinacy.50 In the public's eye, the Fourth Estate 
seems as capable at vindicating its silent brethren as are the 
courts and legislative bodies at preserving their dignity through 
contempt proceedings. The existence or non-existence of the privi-
lege would seem to have little effect then on the due administra-
tion of justice. The actual result has been that the administra-
tion of certain proceedings has been inconvenienced or hampered 
in varying degrees, newsmen have been jailed for short periods, 
and the press emotionally has claimed another martyr. While 
theoretically this course may in part follow "the trend of best 
legal judgment"51 in disallowing further occupational privileges, 
it fails to win measurable benefits for the public. 
A more rational course to pursue would be one which does 
not settle the matter solely on the question of the witness' occupa-
tional pursuit. Looking to broader grounds of public benefit and 
detriment which would flow from allowance or denial of a privi-
lege is preferable.52 Such flexibility has been injected in other 
personal testimonial privileges. The widely recognized privilege 
of law enforcement officers not to reveal their confidentail in-
formants is limited and can be denied if the trial judge feels such 
revelation is necessary to protect the rights of the defendant.53 
And, in North Carolina, the physician-patient privilege is similarly 
50 Of the cases discussed in this note, only two have resulted in the 
newsman's identification after his citation for contempt, These are: In 
the :Matter of Wayne, 4 Hawaii Dist. Ct. 475 (1914); Eddie Barr (un-
reported) N.Y. Times, March 13, 1931. p. 25, col. 8. 
ul II Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 4 9 6 ( 19 4 7). 
l:i2 The New York Law Revision Commission recommended such a middle 
course after its extensive study. The recommended statute, which has not 
been enacted, provided that "The body, officer, person or party seeking 
the information may apply to the supreme court for an order divesting 
the reporter of the privilege. . . . The order shall be granted only when 
the court, after hearing the parties, shall find that disclosure is essential 
to the protection of the public interest." New York Law Revision Com-
mission Legis. Doc. 65 (A) 6-7 (1949). The qualified privilege narrowly 
won the favor of the New York State Society of Newspaper Editors by 
an 18 to 13 vote. Editor & Publisher 9 (Feb. 5, 1949). The New York 
Herald Tribune complained editorial!y that the proposed bill was "a 
bumbling effort which allows the courts to say what is news ... " Editor 
& Publisher 50 (Feb. 19, 1949). 
ro Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938). See Annot., 83 L. Ed. 
155 (1939). 
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conditioned, 64 a limitation that has won favorable comment as 
putting needed flexibility into the rule. 55 Thus it should be with 
a journalist's claim of privilege. This general approach has been 
urged by Zachariah Chafee Jr., in his report on "Government and 
Mass Communications." Chafee urged: 
... [J]udges should retain their present power to -0rder a 
reporter to testify or else go to jail for contempt. 
On the other hand, this power to make reporters disclose their 
confidential sources of information should be exercised with great 
caution. The power also applies to priests, as just stated, but few 
lawyers or judges would press a question to a priest after he had 
invoked his professional duty of silence. It is similarly desir-
able to respect the reporter's claim of confidence except in cases 
of great necessity where he clearly possesses knowledge which is 
otherwise unobtainable.56 
Unfortunately, the restraint urged by Chafee finds little support 
from either the reported opinions or from the journalist privilege 
statutes. These sources would point to one of the two extremes, 
complete denial or blanket acceptance of a privilege, leaving no 
room for compromise. 
The sympathetic attitudes frequently reflected by judges and 
law officers towards those newsmen who have been held in con-
tempt perhaps reflects a latent recognition of merit in the journa-
list's position.57 A review of the cases in this field could lead one 
to conclude that the contempt power is being exercised only as a 
matter of ritual much as a reluctant father adminsters a spanking 
in a this-will-hurt-me-as-much-as-you frame of mind. With policy 
lines clearly drawn in a qualified privilege so that the journalist 
and the responsible authority know where the public good does 
or does not demand disclosure of the journalist's source, it would 
seem the proper authority would be more free to use whatever 
IH The North Carolina privilege is concluded with the following pro-
vision: "Provided, that the presiding judge of a superior court may com-
pel such disclosure, if in his opinion the same is necessary to a proper 
administration of justice." N.C. Gen. Stats. § 8-53 (Michie, 1953). 
55 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 5, § 2381. 
56 II Chafee, op. cit. supra note 51, at 496-97. 
57 E.g., Jack Durham and Wesley Carty (unreported) Editor & Pub-
lisher 3 (Aug. 4, 1934). These two reporters were subjected daily to 
incarceration or fines for refusing to disclose who had given them an 
advance tip on the hanging in effigy of a member of the Kentucky House 
of Representatives. But, the pair were allowed to work their normal 
hours and spend off-duty hours in jail. They were released when a col-
lege student volunteered evidence. 
In the Leonard and Clark case, see notes 27-29 supra, the newsmen 
were allowed to received calls and presents (including a cake with files 
protruding through the icing) and to write news stories from their cells. 
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force would be necessary to obtain the needed information. With 
reported authorities on the point as clearly and broadly stated 
as they are, recognition of a qualified privilege probably could 
not come about without legislation. Such a limited privilege 
could be spelled out in the following manner: 
Subject to the following two exceptions, no person engaged 
in the work of gathering, writing, publishing or disseminating 
news for any newspaper, periodical. press association, or radio or 
television station, shall be held in contempt by any authority for 
refusing to divulge the source of information which such person 
has accepted in confidence and caused to be published or dis-
seminated. Exception 1. This privilege shall not apply where 
the information gained by such person concerned the details of 
any proceeding which was required to be secret under the laws of 
this state or of the federal government. Exception 2. This privi-
lege shall not apply where it shall be shown conclusively to the 
judge of the district court, in which district the proceeding is 
taking place, that (a) all plausible sources of information have 
been exhausted, and (b) the proceeding or inquiry cannot be 
concluded without taking testimony from the source or sources 
sought to be kept secret under this statute. 
W. D. Lorensen, '57 
